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This is part III of an oral history interview with Mr. Henry Glass, held in the Pentagon on October 28, 1987 at 10:40 a.m. Representing the OSD Historical Office are Drs. Alfred Goldberg, Lawrence Kaplan, Robert Watson, and Maurice Matloff.

Matloff: Mr. Glass, in the past two sessions we discussed your service as Economic Adviser to the Comptroller, 1953-61. Today we would like to focus on your roles as Economic Adviser to the Comptroller, 1961-65, and as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1965-68, in the McNamara period. Would you describe your role and functions in this period, in general?

Glass: My chief clients were McNamara and Gilpatric. Gilpatric liked to make a lot of speeches, and that took time to prepare. I finally had to tell him that I just could not carry everything and that he should get a speechwriter. Gilpatric was a very precise writer, himself. When he went over the text of a speech, he always improved it. He was a typical Wall Street lawyer. He always wore a vest in the office; when he took his coat off, he kept the vest on. In the beginning he worked very well with McNamara. When I dealt with McNamara, he was usually present.

McNamara was interested in the intelligence on the ICBM. He took the lead and Gilpatric, the number two man, went along. I suspect that may be why he left eventually; being number two was too confining a role. McNamara himself took on an enormous amount of work that had theretofore been done by the Comptroller, the Deputy, and others. It was definitely a centralization of control. He was a super manager, the best we've seen around here by far. The missile gap, of course, was a troublesome item. It was one of the big issues on which Kennedy ran during the presidential campaign. McNamara wanted to satisfy himself as to the facts. So we took all of the NIEs in sequence, year by year, and showed on each line

the NIE projection of the Soviet ICBM force for each year. You could see the successive reductions in the estimates each year as we approached the latest NIE. That tabulation convinced him that there was no missile gap.

Matloff: I take it that this was in the transition period, in the early period. In general, how did your functions change under McNamara from what they had been in the Eisenhower period?

Glass: The Secretary became a much more important client for me than before. McNamara's scope of work was much broader and deeper. The budget statements became longer, from 30 double-spaced unclassified pages to about 400 classified pages double-spaced, plus tables. They became books. He was a much more active Secretary and ran the business in much greater detail. My scope broadened to that extent, but at the same time I had to prepare the Comptroller's statement and write Hitch's speeches, including the very first one he gave upon receiving an award for his book The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age.

Matloff: How did this dual responsibility come about? Did McNamara or Gilpatric give you special instructions?

Glass: No, I had already been in the business, and had picked up from Col. Randall the job of preparing the Secretary's annual budget statement and the Deputy Secretary's reclama statement.

Goldberg: In 1959?

Glass: Earlier, 1953-54.

Goldberg: While Randall was still there he turned it over to you?

Glass: Yes. I came down in late 1953 and one of the first jobs I had was to respond to Randall's memorandum requesting contributions to the Secretary's Statement. I must have taken over in 1954. I wrote the 1955 statement, because when I brought in the Comptroller's contribution for Wilson's statement I commented about his "cut and paste" procedure. That's when he said that if I thought I could do it better, to do it, and I did it from then on.

Goldberg: This was what gave you your first and most important entree into the Secretary's office?

Glass: Yes, I became a sort of functionary of the Secretary himself. Randall was quite generous in seeing to it that I sat in on important meetings that would have a bearing on what the Secretary and Deputy Secretary would be telling the Congress.

Matloff: Were you given a title as Assistant with the coming of McNamara?

Glass: Before McNamara I worked for the Comptroller, McNeil, and that was quite satisfactory. McNeil was always out front and took the heat. His mere presence was helpful. At one time when McElroy was Secretary we had written a longer than normal statement getting into the whole question of the missile gap and whether we were indeed the underdog. We responded to that by taking a look at the balance in the world, not only militarily, but economically. His aide, Ollie Gale, said, "I doubt he will want to go with this, but let's arrange a meeting with him after he's had a chance to read it." So we did, and McElroy said, "I don't know enough about this." This gives you an idea of how this business was run

around here at that time. He said, "I just don't know enough about this and I don't want to open this subject up for questions by the committee, because I'm going to run out of answers." I said, "I hoped that this time we would come out fighting in responding to the attacks on the Defense policies and programs." He said, "You mean I should come out fighting." McNeil said, "But we'll be there holding the towels." I had to go back and chop that portion out of the statement. Oddly enough, when we appeared before the Mahon Committee, Mahon told him, "Your predecessor, Charlie Wilson, always gave us the benefit of his views on the world situation, as it bears on the Defense program." So his decision proved not to be wise, but he felt he just didn't know enough about it at the time. So I was already deep into the job of doing the Secretary's statements on the Defense budget. I also went to the Hill with McElroy as one of three back-up men, which Max had done before me.

Matloff: Did you receive any instructions when Hitch and McNamara came in about the nature of your responsibilities?

Glass: McNamara made it clear that I would be working for him and for Hitch. After a certain incident I asked McNamara to transfer me directly to his staff. He talked to Hitch, who objected. So McNamara subsequently called me and said I would have to work for both of them. He never set a limit on my staff, but three men and two secretaries was all I wanted, a little team that knew everything we were doing and worked together as a team. I had to continue on both jobs until Hitch left. McNamara felt some obligation to Hitch, because Hitch was his man. After Hitch left, I

worked exclusively for the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, so I was called the Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. It gave me a good deal of relief.

Goldberg: What was your title under Hitch?

Glass: I really don't remember. It could be anything I wanted it to be. Neither Hitch nor McNamara was concerned about things like that.

Matloff: Was the transition from the previous Secretaries to the McNamara period difficult, and also from the McNeil-Lincoln era to Hitch?

Glass: Gates and Douglas, the deputy, put themselves out as much as one could expect to help the transition. They were nice, responsible men of good will, and were very helpful. I was made available to McNamara and Gilpatric by Gates, before they took office. The transition went very well. McNamara came in on the run.

There was no real problem in moving over from Lincoln to Hitch. Hitch came from Rand. I had seen him before out at Wright Field many years ago. He was an economist by training, and so am I, so we had a lot in common. He caught pneumonia early on and was out of the business for several weeks. Dave Novick, also from RAND, who was not an employee of the government, took over as acting Comptroller and sat in Hitch's office during Hitch's absence. That was a rough spot. Novick was a loud, boisterous, but able and likable man. He had a leading position at Rand and was one of the pioneers of the whole planning, programming, and budgeting concept. He knew his own worth. He caused some problems, such as on what to do about reversing the Eisenhower policy on deployment of military

families abroad. I had to work about a month through Novick, and he really didn't know the Defense Department.

Matloff: How closely did you work with Hitch, when he came back?

Glass: That was a very intimate relationship. I not only did his official statements, but also wrote his speeches.

Matloff: Did you enjoy working for him?

Glass: Yes, but to do both jobs became too much.

Matloff: What were your working relationships with McNamara?

Glass: He was probably the most accessible Secretary I worked for, oddly enough, considering how busy he was. He had a peephole in the door, and if no one was with him I could go into his office unannounced at any time. There were no appointments necessary. I had direct communication with him. I didn't have a secure line, and I had to go up to his office to discuss classified matters. Working on this huge statement, I had to talk to him, especially early on, as to its form.

Matloff: Are you referring to the posture statements?

Glass: Yes. He gave me access to documents, and whatever was necessary to get the job done. After he made the statement, we had the transcripts to edit. I had the last word on the transcripts before they were returned to the Hill. They were very long and there was a lot of running back and forth. McNamara never looked at his transcript after it was edited. It was my responsibility. If I wasn't sure what he wanted to appear in print, I put it to him and got the answer directly from him. I did get into trouble once with President Kennedy on the editing of the transcripts.

Goldberg: Do you interpret this as meaning that he had enough confidence in you that he didn't have to look at the transcript?

Glass: Yes.

Goldberg: But not in the case of McNeil and Nitze?

Glass: They were both bureaucrats. They would go over their transcripts in detail. Not Laird; he left that to Baroody. I did it and Baroody would do the review. McNamara never looked at the unclassified version of his posture statement. That was surprising to me, since that was the version that went to the public, including abroad.

Matloff: Did you enjoy working for him?

Glass: Yes, of course. He was extremely able; brisk, but very courteous. I'm much more abrasive than he is. He was always under control. Once he had been over something, he took the responsibility for it, for better or worse. He controlled every change. I used a colored pencil, and he used a black one.

Goldberg: What other things did you do for McNamara?

Glass: There was always a flow of memoranda to the President. I was involved in a lot of those.

Goldberg: The DPMs, for instance?

Glass: No, not those, that was strictly Enthoven's creation. But I was involved with the cost reduction program; the ABM, when the decision had to be made by Johnson whether or not to go forward; the TFX; the B-70; and a lot of other activities that went on between the annual statements.

Goldberg: Over time, he asked more and more of you.

Glass: Yes, he considered me the best writer in terms of clarity and logic. I could write the way he liked to talk. If some other element of the staff failed, I would get it at the last minute. The B-70 was one of those; I had 48 hours to do that statement. There was a series of speeches that Bill Kaufmann originally wrote, to expound McNamara's philosophy of defense and foreign affairs, late in his time here. He made me work on those. We never used them; Enthoven spilled cold water on them. He would bring in outside people to do a lot of his speeches. He and Gilpatric also had official speechwriters, who turned over pretty frequently. Another speech I got involved in was in trying to square the circle, the circle being Kennedy's campaign issue of the missile gap, which turned out to be nonexistent. That was brought to a head by a speech by Gilpatric in September of 1961. By September they already had proof that the big Soviet buildup of ICBMs did not exist. Gilpatric gave a speech that made that clear. That rocked the White House. They came back to Yarmolinsky, the special assistant who was the White House liaison. He told me to write something to bridge the gap between the Pentagon and the White House. I did a one hundred page report. But the White House was not satisfied with my approach. Yarmolinsky brought in a writer named Moscowitz who wrote a report, but nothing came of his report either. I wasted a lot of time and so did Moscowitz, and the issue just disappeared by itself in time. I had told Yarmolinsky at the beginning to let it die out, that you cannot reconcile what Kennedy had said as a candidate and what Gilpatric and McNamara were saying as the bosses of the Pentagon, based on their access to all of the data.

Kaplan: The press conference referred to was in February, and there was a flap. It died out almost completely and revived again in September. What was it that revived the issue?

Glass: Gilpatric made that speech in September and said categorically that there was no missile gap.

Kaplan: Why did he feel it necessary to bring it up again?

Glass: To set the record straight. These were honest people. They couldn't bear, once they knew what the facts were, to keep them from the public and to let the myth of the missile gap perpetuate itself. They wanted to clear the record and start off fresh.

Matloff: What were your working relationships with the Deputy Secretaries--Gilpatric, Vance, and Nitze?

Glass: First, you have to understand the relationship of the Deputy to Secretary McNamara. That was different than before. The Deputy's job was to do whatever McNamara couldn't get around to doing or didn't choose to do. That put the Deputy in a difficult situation. He got what was left over; he didn't have a distinct role. That irked Gilpatric, who had been the Under Secretary of the Air Force during the Truman administration. I don't think that it bothered Vance very much, except for the deployment of major forces to Vietnam in 1965. Vance would never publicly disagree with McNamara. If he had any disagreement, he would have lunch with him and keep it between them. Gilpatric wanted more scope and freedom than McNamara allowed. Keeping that in mind, I worked for McNamara and McNamara's attitude toward the Deputy had to be my attitude. I had one incident with

Nitze that was very embarrassing. He was a man of considerable experience and stature when he became Deputy Secretary of Defense. He had some 20 or 30 years in the business. I had great respect for him and worked very closely with him on very friendly terms. I knew who he was and what he had done, and I valued what he had to say, even though on some points I disagreed, and said so. One time towards the end, when I had McNamara's statement in final form, I gave Nitze a copy. McNamara had a rule that nobody saw a copy of the statement in its final form before it was okayed by him. They could see pieces of it, where I needed them to be checked out, but it didn't go outside, and certainly not to the services or to the other parts of OSD. I thought I would like to get Nitze's reaction to it and gave a copy to him personally, and also dropped a copy off to McNamara. I told McNamara that I had just given a copy to Nitze. McNamara said, "I don't want him to have a copy until I've been over it. Go and get it back." Which I did. It was the most embarrassing thing that I've had to do in my life.

Matloff: Were there no set periods during the week when you were checking in with the Deputy Secretaries?

Glass: I rarely dropped in socially. I must have been in Vance's office for some reason when I told Vance that had not McNamara strengthened the Army divisions and made them all combat ready divisions, we wouldn't have been able to deploy the kind of forces which we did to Vietnam early on, considering all the other responsibilities we had, particularly NATO and Korea, where we had pinned down large forces. He must have been in

charge of something I was involved in at that particular time. Maybe McNamara wasn't in the building and I had to clear it with him, Vance. That was the procedure: when McNamara wasn't available, the Deputy took over. He was the alter ego of the Secretary. That was the one time that I heard Vance disagree with McNamara. He said, "I wish to God we hadn't done it, We wouldn't have been able to get involved in the Vietnam War." That's how he felt about it, but that was never made public. You will never see anything in the record about Vance's disagreeing on the policy of getting into the Vietnam War.

Matloff: How about the Assistant Secretaries of Defense, did you see some more than others?

Glass: I saw Tom Morris when he was ASD(I&L), because of the cost reduction program. It was his program, and I wrote the annual memorandum to the President for McNamara, because that's what McNamara wanted and Tom had no objections. Tom was fully cooperative and accessible. All of the Assistant Secretaries were--for example, Brown, DDR&E, and Manpower, especially when Tom Morris was head of it. I could go see anybody, including the Service Secretaries. I went up to see Nitze when he was Secretary of the Navy, when I wasn't too happy with the support I was getting from the naval staff.

Goldberg: By virtue of your doing the Posture Statement and all the other memoranda, you acquired a very considerable depth in substantive matters. Is that correct?

Glass: Absolutely. McNamara expected me to do the leg work and bring the results to him.

Goldberg: So you weren't simply writing a final product. You were doing all of the research work necessary in order to produce the final document. It wasn't a matter of being fed information; it was a matter of acquiring and using it.

Glass: Right. We would write the bulk of the statement and send it out to the various parts of the Department for comment and changes. We did a lot of business with Systems Analysis, because they formed up the program.

Goldberg: So you saw a lot of Enthoven.

Glass: Enthoven, and his staff, because there was a time when we had strategic offensive and defensive forces and he had a separate office for each. I precipitated the merging of those two offices. Each office insisted on using a different data base for its program analysis and I told McNamara I couldn't reconcile the two. I worked directly with these people, who were very helpful. No one man could know it all. The trick was knowing from whom to get the information. If the subordinates knew more, you got it from them. I didn't have to deal with the Service Secretaries very often, except in the case of Nitze, who said to come to him directly when I told him that I wasn't receiving the help that I needed.

Matloff: How about with ISA?

Glass: At the beginning I dealt with Nitze, Bill Bundy, and Harry Rowen, the last because he had the NATO policy area. A big issue during the first year was increasing the M-day NATO forces from 30 to 40 divisions. Harry Rowen worked up that piece of business. Since he was in charge of it, I went to talk to him.

Goldberg: Ellsberg, too?

Glass: I talked with him in connection with the Vietnam War. He was a hawk at that point. He criticized what I had written in the annual statement on the Vietnam War, that it wasn't tough enough. He was not an important man, and I didn't put much weight on what he said. My job was to write what I understood to be McNamara's views. If other people didn't like it, they could take it up with him, which people did from time to time. My policy always was to avoid getting between the SecDef and the rest of the staff.

Matloff: Since you were acquiring all this substantive information, did the Secretary ever ask you for your thoughts on a particular problem?

Glass: He didn't have to. I always volunteered my views.

Goldberg: Did he on occasion ask?

Glass: I don't recall. I was always telling him things, but he no doubt asked me questions and my opinion from time to time.

Goldberg: How did you know what he would want in the statements?

Glass: I would talk to him and to Gilpatric early on, for example, in shaping up what the statement ought to be.

Goldberg: So you did have sessions with McNamara?

Glass: Many sessions, as to the nature of the statement. McNamara said, "I don't care if it takes a thousand pages. I want to get into the details of the programs and give the pros and cons." I told him that was not the way it was done here; that we have an adversary relationship with the Congress. We make our case and let them make their case. Early on, if you look at the statements closely, especially the first one, the FY 1963

budget, you will see that I did what he wanted, and gave the pros and cons on the various programs. In later statements you will see that procedure died out. He had all he could do to make and protect the administration's case. I felt, as I did with Wilson, McElroy, and Gates, that we should have something to say about the world situation, the background against which all the military programs were being designed. At first, McNamara did not think that was useful. He wanted to get right into the programs, and start right with the strategic forces programs. But he told me to go ahead and he would look at what I came up with. If you look at the FY 1963 statement, you will see a fairly skimpy first chapter. If you look at the subsequent statements, they were much longer, with more detail. After the first time around, he said, "You are right on that. Now I want you really to get into it in detail." In a lot of that chapter I had to work with various parts of ISA. On the R&D, of course, I had to work with the R&D people. And I did work with Brown. He organized the break-down of the RDT&E program--the basic research, the applied research--but he also, for the first time, began to make the distinctions between the two. That dictated how that chapter was organized.

Matloff: York's period spilled over somewhat into the McNamara era. You probably had some relations with him also in the beginning.

Glass: Herbert York had had a heart attack, and he wanted out as soon as possible. He was here until they could get somebody to replace him. That was Harold Brown. There were three in a row from Livermore. I was on good terms with York from before.

Goldberg: How about the Military Assistants and the other Special Assistants: George Brown, Yarmolinsky, Califano, Haig, and others who were around McNamara?

Glass: My relationship with Yarmolinsky began when McNamara called me in to his office to meet him. He was put here by the White House. At the beginning, they put people in every department, sort of commissars. (There was a man named Klotz, over in Commerce, known as the klutz, who got into trouble of some sort.) Adam Yarmolinsky was put in as Special Assistant, because that is the White House liaison job. They wanted to be able to get him on the phone and tell him and he would tell McNamara. He would be the channel. When I first met Yarmolinsky, McNamara told me to show him around and help him get settled. Then we walked over to Yarmolinsky's office across the hall on the E Ring and we did some talking. He wondered if he was entitled to a car and chauffeur. This is the great radical lawyer, the defender of the poor. I suggested, "You don't really need it. You can use any Assistant Secretary's car if he is not using it. If worst comes to worst, you can use a staff car. You never have to take a cab." I think Baroody was the first Special Ass't. to get one himself, surreptitiously, because that job was not entitled to one. We talked about other things--his functions, who was who, and so on.

Matloff: Was there any resentment on McNamara's part about being given a Special Assistant without his prior approval? He made it a point when he took the job that he would have final approval.

Glass: No, at least he never expressed it to me. How about Kennedy's pal, Fay, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy? Fay was over in the White

House most of the time; he was hardly ever here. Secretary of the Navy John Connally was not McNamara's choice; he was Lyndon Johnson's choice. Zuckert was an old Democratic warhorse in the D.C. area.

Goldberg: He was well known to McNamara. They were at the Harvard Business School together.

Glass: There were others. Elvis Stahr, Secretary of the Army, didn't last long. He was a college president and he wasn't used to being on the job at 8:00 a.m. when McNamara started business.

Goldberg: What was your relationship with the military assistants?

Glass: They were never in my way. I never had to go through them as I did with Col. Randall. Nobody could have the authority with McNamara that Randall had had with Wilson, because McNamara ran the business himself. He was the spark plug and linch pin of the whole operation. The military assistants simply did what they were told. I never had to work through them. McNamara got rid of his principal military assistant, Means Johnson, whom Gates brought in from the Navy. Johnson was a very fine man but he was very vague and spoke in generalities. McNamara couldn't stand the relaxed discussions and moved him out.

Goldberg: He got to be a four-star admiral, anyhow.

Glass: He had good connections on the Hill. He was Legislative Liaison for the Navy at one point. He was a very likable, pleasant, sociable man, but not McNamara's type.

Matloff: How about Califano and Haig?

Goldberg: They came after Yarmolinsky. They are still part of the same thing. Califano took over from Yarmolinsky in 1963.

Matloff: How about the JCS, its chairmen, and the military services? What dealings did you have with the JCS?

Glass: The main contact with JCS was the officer who sat in the Chairman's suite, General Whisenand, when Twining was Chairman.

Matloff: On what kinds of issues or questions?

Glass: The main issue was what the Secretary was saying, especially where the Chiefs disagreed with him. One of my functions, which became routine, was to go down and talk to that officer who represented the Chairman, to agree on what the Chiefs and the Secretary would disagree on before the congressional committees.

Goldberg: Was this with reference to specific parts of the Posture Statements?

Glass: Yes. I think that somebody on the Hill wanted to know what the Chiefs thought about these controversial issues, and to keep the thing manageable we tried not to get involved in a lot of minor operational problems, but just problems of program substance--i.e., forces and weapon programs. I would sit down with this man and try to eliminate as many of the differences as we could, to narrow the list down to the smallest number of issues, and to clarify the two positions. McNamara did not want to be caught censoring the Chairman, or any of the other Chiefs for that matter, but he wanted the list of differences to be manageable. I understand that whenever they would fly out to talk to the President around Thanksgiving, to give him some inkling of how the Defense program and budget were shaping up, McNamara would pressure the Chiefs along the

same line--"Here's my position, what's your position?" He was a good manager. So that was the main dealing I had with the Joint Chiefs through the officer I referred to. One of the early problems was that once the format of the programming system was established, the strategic forces program and so on, it did not fit in with the JSOP. The JSOP was organized in terms of general war forces and limited war forces. That's the way we used to discuss these matters, prior to the introduction of the new programming system. Even when the programming system was installed and operating and McNamara's statement organized, the Chiefs came barreling along with their JSOP on the old basis. You couldn't relate the two. One of my jobs was to hammer away at them to revise the format of the JSOP to accord with the programming system, which was now the way the program was being managed by the Secretary of Defense. It took them a couple of years to swing around and do that.

Matloff: Were you dealing with the Director of the Joint Staff?

Glass: From time to time, but mainly with the officer I referred to earlier, the Assistant to the Chairman. The title "Assistant" never fully reflected the role of the incumbent. George Brown and Goodpaster both held that job. This man represented the Chairman. As long as Chairman of the JCS Wheeler was around, I did business with him. Another one was the Chairman's legislative assistant, the man who prepared the Chairman's annual budget statement at that time. The relationship of my little office to this individual was very close, going back to the beginning of the Eisenhower administration. That man was always a JAG officer, a

lawyer from the Navy, and later from the Marine Corps. It was a stepping stone to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy job. He was also legal adviser to the Chairman and went with him to the Hill. He was responsible for seeing to it that the Chairman's statement was prepared. Before McNamara, the Chairman's statement was off the record, so we didn't have to confront the problem of what would appear in public print. I forget what they used to call that statement, but it had to do with the comparison of "their" forces and "our" forces, especially NATO vs. the Warsaw Pact.

Goldberg: Net Assessment?

Glass: No, but they had a name for it.

Matloff: You touched before on the service secretaries. What contacts did you have with them?

Glass: Before we leave the Chairman, this is very significant. Because McNamara covered the whole waterfront, the intelligence, military balance, and all of that, the problem for the Chairman's speechwriter was what the Chairman should say this year. We would talk it over and decide what should be said by the Chairman to supplement the Secretary's statement. One time I suggested to Wheeler, when he was Chairman, that he talk about the capabilities of the South Vietnamese military leadership, which he could do with much more authority than McNamara. He liked the idea and made a special trip to Vietnam to meet with the local military leaders before he went to the Hill. Once ABM was a hot issue. McNamara and Wheeler agreed to disagree and each present his side, with Wheeler putting forward the position of the Chiefs in favor of fully deploying the ABM.

Each year we would find something special that would make the Chairman's statement useful in adding something more to the overall DoD presentation.

Matloff: What contacts did you have with the service secretaries?

Glass: I attended the weekly meeting held by McNamara in the morning. The service secretaries, the Chiefs, the assistant secretaries, various other people, and I would be there. My policy was to talk to the man who knew the most about a subject, and that rarely meant the service secretaries. They would call me occasionally, when they didn't like something that was in the Secretary's [McNamara's] statement, and would try to pressure me to change it. From time to time, one of them would ask me to talk to McNamara about a particular issue of great concern to him. Zuckert asked me to urge McNamara to hold on to AF inventories of conventional bombs, which Enthoven proposed to dump in favor of the new "smart" bombs.

Matloff: Whom were you touching bases with in the services?

Glass: You know whom we left out in OSD? the Comptroller. We had a very close relationship to the Comptroller's staff, the budget staff. They had the budget numbers, not the systems analysis people. In the transition from the whole programming process to the budget, the third phase, we had to deal with the budget people to get the final numbers that went into the U.S. government budget, into the Secretary's statement, and into the statements of all the services. We didn't want people talking different numbers for the same thing. That coordinating process was difficult. We had to get the statement out to the services, wherever we used numbers;

e.g., the cost of a particular carrier, to be sure that the actual programming numbers and the related budget numbers would be worked out with the Comptroller. We had to deal with the chief budget man, even more than the Comptroller himself, on this matter. As long as Hitch was Comptroller, there was no problem. He had a good understanding of the matter and saw to it that people responded promptly.

Matloff: Did you, the Comptroller, or the Sec/Def ever have any problems getting information from the services in connection with the budget or anything else?

Glass: It was a dangerous thing to try to keep information from McNamara. He set an example early on with the Net Evaluation subcommittee of the NSC. Gen. Leon Johnson told McNamara they were not working for him, and McNamara got rid of that subcommittee. McNamara did not tolerate the withholding of information. Another man I dealt with was Gen. Carroll, the head of DIA, in 1965.

Goldberg: Knowing what the services were like, do you have any doubts in your mind that they probably did withhold certain kinds of information from McNamara?

Glass: They always tried to withhold and, no doubt, did so from time to time; it is the job of the OSD staff to ferret out that information. You have to know what questions to ask. The C-5 cost overrun was one of the disasters. I got wind of it and talked to the Lockheed representative here. Rumors were floating that the C-5 was going to cost a lot more than had been acknowledged up to that time. There was a nice fellow

representing Lockheed here and I told him I would like him to see if the rumors were true. That didn't prove too useful. The Air Force knew that they were overrunning. A colonel came down to meet with us in Nitze's office and said, "I have to tell you, Mr. Secretary, that the C-5 is going to cost more than we have said up to now." There was a major who seemed to know the most about the costing. At the very time that Fitzgerald went up to the Hill we were working on a full disclosure of this information. The major was giving us everything that we asked for. Fitzgerald jumped the gun. He wasn't even in this circuit. We could have done it in an orderly way without raising this whole problem. So they certainly do withhold, although this incident occurred after McNamara left, I believe.

Goldberg: Does that include the JCS, also?

Glass: They get the information from the services, too, except in operational matters. I don't recall any real problems with the JCS or the services. The systems analysis people began to work with the services on each annual cycle even before the budget examiners. The budget examiners had to deal with the precise dollar figures. Enthoven and company could generalize, but in getting the data the Enthoven group had a continuous working relationship with the service groups. The services had to organize systems analysis shops or similar organizations in order to cope with Enthoven's people. One year I had to go in and tell McNamara that I couldn't get the statement finished in time, because we could not reconcile numbers between the services, Enthoven, and the OSD budget people. It was 7:00 p.m. and he began calling people at

home. He told Enthoven to assign one man to Army, one to Navy, one to the Air Force, and close up on these numbers. That Saturday night, before the presentation Monday on the Hill, we were calling people out of the officers club to verify figures, on Pershing, for example.

Matloff: Could you describe Hitch's and McNamara's relations with Congress?

Glass: Hitch did not have the role that McNeil had. McNamara took away a lot of the important functions that McNeil performed; for example, the review of the budget. McNamara reviewed the budget. McNeil used to handle the reprogramming reports to the Congress, where money would be used for some other purpose than the appropriation committees were told; within the language of the appropriation, but for some other sub-program. There was an exchange of letters in the mid-1950s working out an agreement between the Defense Department and the appropriation committees on how these reprogrammings would be handled so that the DoD should not have so much leeway in switching money from one program to another without informing the committees, or, in certain cases, getting advance approval. There were certain things for which we had to get prior approval, certain things we had to tell them after the fact; and other things we could group together and provide summary dollar totals. Those things were not done by the Secretary. That function was in McNeil's office. When McNamara took over, he signed all the reprogramming requests himself. The whole function moved up to his office.

Matloff: How about McNamara's relations with the Congress?

Glass: At the beginning they were overwhelmed by his knowledge, but he was not well liked, because members of the Congress do not like people

who are much smarter than they are, and show it. McNamara did not have high esteem for many of them, either. Once, coming back from the Hill, he said, "You know, there are a lot of stupid people on these committees." I said, "We have a representative government, and there are a lot of stupid people among the voters." On another occasion, with reference to the third Kennedy amendment to the Eisenhower budget, in the first year of the Kennedy administration, which added several billion dollars and strengthened the NATO forces, Senator Pastore asked McNamara why our allies, right on the firing line, were not mobilizing and didn't seem to be as alarmed as we were. McNamara found it a difficult question to answer. I told him that I thought that it was a good question, and he said he thought it was a dumb question. I still think it was a good question, and one that I had in my own mind at the time.

Matloff: What happened as time went on, did his relations with Congress change?

Glass: They deteriorated. He was the smart boy on the block, and a real target. They tried to knock holes in him. One time--in the third or fourth year of McNamara's tenure--Laird had his staff go back over each annual statement and compare the changes, to show how McNamara didn't know all the answers and had to change some of them as time went on. Each year I would go over what we had told the Committees the year before, and if we had changed the story I would explain the change. Laird didn't know that and his staff didn't know it, and we were able to take care of that problem and say, "If you really look at the statements, you will

find these changes explained year by year." Laird's purpose was to take McNamara down a peg or so. A lot of them tried to do it. The Republican side tried to do that all the time. Sometimes they did a pretty good job on him.

Matloff: Were you drawn in on the hearings, and were you dealing with the congressional staffs and committees yourself?

Glass: Yes, the same as we had before. Three of us from the Comptroller's office would go up with the Secretary, the Comptroller, and the Chairman for the opening, the unveiling of the annual program and budget. The three--the assistant general counsel for fiscal affairs, the chief budget officer, and I--would go up as backup men. It became apparent to me pretty early that McNamara didn't need us, because he had, in addition to the statement, a set of backup books, each of which had to be an inch thick. No matter how I would arrange these backup papers--we would develop a hundred or more--he would rearrange them himself to suit his presentation. He could immediately turn to the right backup paper in the right book to supplement what was in the statement. It was perhaps in the second year, during a break in the hearings before the Mahon committee, that Mahon, who knew us from before, came around and said, "I see you boys are unemployed," because we really had no need to back him up. He knew all the answers. It became clear that all he needed was somebody to carry the books, and I couldn't afford the time for that, so I dropped out, and then the other two. I didn't accompany him after the first year or so. We did, of course, work very closely with the committee staffs, particularly on the

transcripts where something was misspoken by McNamara. When a member would run him down with a series of questions and McNamara would run out of answers, which happened occasionally, we were able to edit the transcript and smooth over the problem. We did this even for other Defense officials. Having the ability to work with the Committee staff and edit the record before it was published was very important to OSD.

Matloff: Did this go back to McNamara?

Glass: Yes, even before I was in the business. But with McNamara it became particularly important to do that, because he never read the transcripts, unless I brought something to him.

Matloff: Did he ever object to anything that you had written in?

Glass: No. There was one piece in which I put in more than a page of the printed hearing that he never knew about. I showed it to him some years later. It was worked in as if he said it, not as an insert. We could do that with the Secretary's testimony, as long as the chief clerk of the committee agreed to it and the member who was involved agreed to it. We did a lot of this sort of thing. We had a good working relationship, which I understand doesn't exist as much today. We helped them with their staff work, and they were accommodating to our side. We saved a lot of trouble and embarrassment by having the right to make changes.

Goldberg: These really occurred where he was responding to questions from other members of the committee. That was really your big job in the transcripts.

Glass: There was the famous incident over the Bomarc, where I didn't anticipate that we would get involved in the Canadian elections, of all things. I left in the printed Hearings what McNamara said about the Bomarc program. It was simply a statement of the obvious. I just didn't take it out. That kicked up a rumpus in Canada, which had Bomarcs, and Kennedy wanted me to be fired because of that. McNamara took responsibility, and that was the end of that.

Matloff: Aside from questions of personality, on what issues did you find Congress most sensitive, in the Defense field and in their dealings with McNamara?

Glass: First of all, McNamara always spoke to them as the "professor." There was a certain talking down. And he always seemed to have answers. If he didn't have one, he thought it up on the spot. He is very bright and has a very fast mind. He can think much faster than most people, and a lot faster than poor old Lemnitzer could think. Lemnitzer had a hard time with McNamara because of that. And the people on the Hill are not all that smart, and sort of resented it. One of McNamara's favorites was Congressman Ford, with whom he got along very well, although of the opposite party. Ford was very sincere and did not ask questions simply to trip the witness, the way Lipscomb, Minshall, and Laird did. Congressman Minshall was a jokester who would try to trip McNamara up just for the fun of it. He asked McNamara, "This is a magnificent statement. How do you do it?" McNamara mumbled, but he never wanted to admit somebody else was doing it. Minshall knew all the time who was doing it, because

I was doing it before McNamara. The committees made it their business to know who was who in the Pentagon, and there was no reason why they shouldn't know. Minshall kept after McNamara, but he never answered his question. When I got the transcript, I called the Chief clerk, Bob Michaels, and asked to take that colloquy out because it was embarrassing for McNamara. Bob Michaels said if Minshall agreed, we could take it out. Minshall had had his fun and did agree. If you want to look at the raw transcripts, some of which you have in your files, you will see how they have been edited. Minshall was really an easygoing man. Laird was one of the hardest-nosed people. Ford was the senior Republican on the committee. Laird was the Republican hatchet man. He was always the man behind Ford. It was his job to try to knock down the administration. Our job in editing the transcript was to take out as much of that poison as possible.

Matloff: What was your relationship with other agencies, such as the Bureau of the Budget?

Glass: As long as Sam Cohn, who was in charge of the budget message, was there, it was a lot easier. I had worked with him way back in the Eisenhower administration. In the Kennedy administration, the budget message was no longer as important as in prior administrations. Kennedy was content to let McNamara carry the ball on Defense. In fact, Kennedy expected each head of a department to defend his programs and not depend on the President to do all the fighting. My main contact with the BoB was in connection with the budget message, with Sam Cohn and his successors, and with Veach and Schaub, who headed up the military division of

the BoB. Sometimes we would get involved in a questionnaire--a statistical form--that we wanted to send out to industry. That brought us into the other part of the BoB, the management part, which had the review function over all the questionnaires sent out to the private sector.

Matloff: Any sharp differences with the Director or his staff?

Glass: The relationship of the Secretary of Defense to the Director of BoB was quite different under McNamara than under his predecessors. In the Eisenhower administration there were sharp differences. In the last Eisenhower budget we were pressed by Maurice Stans, who was the director at the time, to cut the budget at the President's direction. We had gone through exercises with Gates to try to scale down everything. After all was said and done, we were still too high and Lincoln said, "What shall we do now? That's as far as Gates and Douglas are willing to go." It was their last budget, so they didn't particularly care. I said, "Why don't you call Stans and tell him that we have squeezed as much as we could. If you want it lower, you will have to tell us what to cut." Lincoln did so and Stans said, much to our surprise, it was all right, we didn't have to cut any more. Obviously, he had expected us to come out with a higher figure than he gave us.

Goldberg: What happened when McNamara came in?

Glass: Before McNamara, the Secretary of Defense or the Comptroller would go over to the BoB office for the final settlement of the Defense budget. When McNamara arrived on the scene, the Director of BoB came to the Pentagon with his staff and assembled in the Secretary's dining room. They and the White House people would sit with their backs to the wall

and the Secretary's staff would sit with their backs to the windows. A man in the military division of the BoB and I would take parallel notes and compare them to see that we got a common understanding of what took place there. McNamara sat at the head of the table, as the judge. That always amused me. He would turn to Enthoven and say, "Alain, I think they have a point. Take another look at that problem," and go on to the next question. He would take the role of the President, in other words, reconciling the differing points of view. That was the first time that this had been done to my knowledge, and I suspect the first time in history that a department head did not go across the river to make the settlements with the director of the BoB, who was the President's man.

Goldberg: Did this mean that no further changes were made beyond this point and the President's budget message?

Glass: No. These were actually the first round of settlements. Some issues had to be left to the President for final settlement. But the objective of these meetings was to reduce to a minimum the number of issues which the President had to resolve. It was while we were in one of these sessions that Kennedy was shot. That gives you the time of year--November. We were proceeding with the meeting. Kennedy's NSC Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, was there. McNamara had an Air Force sergeant, Overturf, who sat outside at the entrance to his office. He came in quietly and gave McNamara a piece of paper. McNamara excused himself and went back to his office. He came back to the meeting room and called McGeorge Bundy

out and announced that the President had been shot and that the meeting was terminated. They got in touch with the Chairman, Max Taylor, and cleared all the telephone lines in the Pentagon. Nobody knew what was cooking. It could have been the start of World War III.

Goldberg: After this meeting, where would subsequent changes be made in the budget?

Glass: At that point they narrowed down the differences and took it back to the President. The proper staff procedure was to clean out everything you could and take the difficult ones to the President to decide. There was still time before the budget went to press to make the final decisions on numbers. The budget message went to print last, so we still had time to monkey around with the rationale, the explanations. That was the sequence of events. They tried to settle between the BoB and the DoD as much as they could. Even before McNamara, though they reviewed jointly, the BoB people reserved their opinions to take home, and when they came in, they had their list of changes they felt ought to be made. The DoD had to justify and try to convince the BoB. Kermit Gordon, the BoB director at the time, found it difficult to stand up to McNamara; it had to be a very clean cut issue for him to do so. That was true also with his successor, Zwick. They were very careful in dealing with McNamara because he knew so much more than they did about the details of the Defense budget request.

Matloff: What were your dealings with the State Department?

Glass: We dealt with two elements. On the classified statement we dealt with the political-military office--Sy Weiss, and another man; they had a

boss of ambassador rank. They were the agency through which we had to deal with the rest of the State Department. I sent them a copy of the classified statement and they would staff it in State and send back a marked up copy. I would run it by McNamara, on the important things that I wasn't sure about. The Secretary of State, Rusk, was in favor of deploying the ABM system, for example. I told these men that this issue should be discussed directly with McNamara. By coincidence I happened to be in McNamara's office when Rusk called about this matter. After he hung up, McNamara said that he thought it odd that Rusk didn't understand what we were driving at in our position on the ABM--that it would affect the strategic balance; that the cost advantage was with the offensive; all the arguments you are familiar with.

Goldberg: And we are still having.

Glass: Yes.

Matloff: Did you or the Secretary ever encounter any difficulties over statements bearing on foreign policy in the Posture Statements?

Glass: We worked through another element of State on the unclassified statement, with a man named Tully for many years. This had to do with what could be said in public. So we had two separate operations, one on substance, and the other on what could be said in public. We would inevitably have dozens of arguments, even on classification. But on policy, we really intruded into the State Department's business with that first chapter. We did try to defer to the State Department wherever possible, because it had the responsibility for foreign policy, but we usually

ironed out those problems pretty handily. On the other hand, they would get involved with the military programs. By that time I had a pretty good understanding of what McNamara's position was on most issues, and the one thing I always tried to avoid was getting between McNamara and the rest of the organization or the government. I always used the same line: "If you don't like it, go talk to McNamara."

Matloff: Did you ever get any feelings that Rusk might have been unhappy with the fact that Defense was taking over this role?

Glass: Rusk was a very mild mannered man. It has been my observation, looking at the administration as a whole, that it depends on the personalities involved. During the early part of the Eisenhower administration George Humphrey got into everything. He was the big wheel at that time. In the Kennedy and Johnson administrations McNamara got into everybody's business. He even got into the SST, which was a civilian enterprise altogether. He was the chairman of the committee.

Goldberg: He claimed he was often pulled into these things, and didn't involve himself.

Glass: I agree, because he was effective. If you put him in charge of something, he would get it done one way or another. There would be a report and it would be finished; it would be a clear cut position, not fuzzed over just to please everybody.

Matloff: I'll offer a slight demurral on Rusk and his being a mild mannered man. Not on the Pentagon Papers; on this issue he feels very strongly.

Glass: He had a right to be angry about that. But, let me go back to John Foster Dulles in the Eisenhower administration. He was in charge of foreign policy, on national security policy in a broad sense, and a very important man. I've always thought Eisenhower was a lot more effective than people thought. Because of his appearance on TV, he looked like the Boob in Herblock's cartoon. If you saw him at work, he was brisk, and not too sensitive to how people felt. He spoke his mind; he could be brusque; he was used to being boss. Who the strong man is in an administration depends on personalities.

Matloff: Why couldn't you have taken something in writing from the State Department itself in the field of foreign policy, and used that?

Glass: That wouldn't have pleased McNamara. We never did, even before McNamara.

Goldberg: State didn't like to do that sort of thing. They were forced to it sometimes. In the late '40s and 50's, Forrestal and his successors tried to get them to do this, and they wouldn't do it. Finally they did it once, but reluctantly. They didn't want to commit themselves to an overall view. Whether this was still so in the '60s, I don't know.

Kaplan: Kissinger's "State of the World."

Glass: Until Kissinger. He was the one to take charge. And even that petered out. Were there three of them?

Kaplan: A preliminary one in 1969 and a big one in 1970.

Glass: Then there were a few more and they petered out. I thought that was a very good contribution. As I have indicated, before McNamara the Secretaries of Defense were quite reluctant to get into that business.

Goldberg: Forrestal had a global view.

Glass: Wilson had a global view, but he liked to do that informally, not so much in his prepared statements. McElroy avoided it, and Gates was careful not to get too far into it.

Matloff: How about relations with the White House, and the White House and NSC staff?

Glass: With the beginning of the Kennedy administration, the NSC really went out of business, as such. The Kennedy administration called in all the outstanding NSC papers to get them out of circulation, so that the military people couldn't keep pointing to an NSC paper as justification. There were some copies or early drafts that remained.

Goldberg: Was this Kennedy's doing, personally?

Glass: I think so, and I agreed with it. It started off fine in the Eisenhower administration. It was a vast improvement over what went before in formalizing policy. Eisenhower always liked good staff work. When they got to the follow-on part of it, the Operations Coordinating Board, that overloaded the system. By that time it became a bureaucratic monstrosity. The OCB papers also had a financial appendix. When Kennedy came in, someone advised him to junk the whole thing, which he did. That gave rise to a problem. The Chiefs would ask me, for example, what they were supposed to look to for guidance. I told them to look at what the President says in his statements and messages and what the Secretary of Defense says. That's the policy guidance. They didn't take too well to that at all, as you can imagine. The NSC paperwork system, as such,

disappeared. Under Johnson, the Tuesday meeting, the informal group that would meet with the President in the White House, in addition to the Cabinet meetings, would serve as the national security advisory group. I don't recall getting involved with the NSC staff during the Kennedy-Johnson years. We did with the White House. In connection with the first Kennedy defense message, in which he announced his new policy views, the new direction of defense policy, and the first amendment to the Eisenhower Defense budget, I got involved with the White House staff, namely, Sorenson. I prepared a draft, based on the work done by the task forces. I don't remember if I had already coordinated it at the staff level, but I took it in to McNamara. He said, "Call Sorenson and arrange to send it over to him. I'll look at what comes back from the White House." He didn't want to waste his time on my draft. I called Sorenson and he told me to send my draft over to him. He made some changes to the opening policy section, but not to the program changes. Sorenson was clearly responsible for the style of the Kennedy speeches, I could tell that from the changes he made to my draft.

Matloff: Did you have any dealings with McGeorge Bundy?

Glass: No, he would deal directly with the Secretary, the Deputy, or the Chiefs. I was only involved in the preparation of a draft, which Sorenson would then review in the White House. We also had Yarmolinsky, the Special Assistant, who was a channel back and forth to the White House.

Matloff: How about your relationships with the press?

Glass: In McNeil's time I was designated as a press contact for his office. They tried to limit the number of people that would deal with the press.

I thought that was a good idea. In fact, I had proposed that a few people be designated for that purpose in each part of the Defense Department. There is nothing more frustrating to those covering the Pentagon than to try to get their questions answered through Public Affairs. Those people don't know subject matter, and it seems unfair to have to go through somebody who doesn't know much and who might distort your question in putting it to the man you really want to get an answer from. I thought there should be a few designated people in each office, so if there was a leak or kickback you know to whom to go. Eisenhower was very much annoyed by leaks. He would send the FBI in. The next morning the FBI people would be wandering around questioning and rounding up the usual suspects. McNeil was smart enough to designate people so that for the Comptroller they would come see me, or Lehrer, when he was here, or McNeil himself. Even in McNeil's time we would have an unofficial session with the main reporters here to give them a preview of the budget. I think that we used to do that, too, with the Secretary's Statement.

Matloff: Did this change under McNamara? Did the issues with which you had dealt with the press change?

Glass: No, except that McNamara would meet with the press himself quite frequently, especially during the Vietnam War, in the conference room, and try to handle their questions. He did a lot of that himself. We talked previously about the missile gap story. A cocktail party was set up so that McNamara could meet the men covering the Pentagon who sit around downstairs in our press room. That's where he said that there was

no missile gap. Most of the reporters felt that that was off the record and didn't use it. But a man named Jack Norris, of The Washington Post, used it. I think Jack Raymond might have used it in the Times. Some of them used it and some didn't. That was a big mistake that McNamara made, because he precipitated an upset in the White House.

Matloff: Did you sit in on any of these conferences with McNamara?

Glass: Yes. From time to time.

Matloff: Did he ever turn to you for information?

Glass: No. The Comptroller would have a press conference on the budget in the afternoon of the day in which the BoB had its press conference. I did play an important role there. Hitch would turn to me and ask me to answer questions, because I had more details than he did.

Kaplan: How much of an infrastructure was built for PPBS in the '50s?

Glass: Eisenhower didn't have anything.

Kaplan: Enthoven was in the Eisenhower administration.

Glass: He was in DDR&E.

Goldberg: Were there already in place some procedures and activities which were really forerunners of PPBS?

Glass: I think there were some in the Air Force staff. At least they projected the program a couple of years to try to figure out costs of things.

Goldberg: What about performance budgets? I think it was a functional budget by actual activities, broken down.

Glass: You mean the program format. The Air Force had its strategic forces, its air defense forces, its tactical forces, and its airlift

forces. So the Air Force had already begun to look at breaking down the forces into functional entities designed to do a particular job. It may have seen some forerunners. Rand was working on that program budget under Air Force auspices for years. Whether the Air Force knew it or not, it paid for the original work on the PPBS. In the Defense Department we thought in terms of general war and limited war forces. That was the breakdown of forces and missions.

Kaplan: So essentially the PPBS comes in de novo, really an original contribution. One more question: I've been reading a critic of McNamara's policies who claimed that McNamara was not very happy with PPBS; that it was essentially Hitch's idea and that what disturbed McNamara was the decision making process going much farther down than he was prepared to accept. He preferred to have the alternatives laid out and the decision made, presumably, at his level, whereas under the PPBS system, apparently, decisions were made at a number of different levels that he had no involvement in.

Glass: I'm amazed to hear that statement. Who was this man?

Kaplan: His name is Palmer.

Glass: He couldn't be more wrong. Let's first address the need for this planning, programming, and budgeting system. I mentioned earlier in connection with the Eisenhower administration the planning, namely JSOP and its predecessors, going on one track and then being shunted on a dead end, and the budget going forward all the way. We were actually managing through the budget and the control of the funds.

Goldberg: That had been true right along, hadn't it?

Glass: Yes, but it was a deficiency which was not easy to mend. That's why the people at Rand had seen and understood that there was a gap here. Either Eisenhower or Truman said, "planning, programming, and budgeting are all part of the same decision, and the Secretary of Defense should get in at the very beginning of the process."

Goldberg: That was probably during the 1958 reorganization.

Glass: The Secretary of Defense should get in at the beginning of the planning process, which has always been the province of the JCS, the staffs, and the services. Each service had a Director of Plans. Those people, through the Joint Staff, and their chiefs together with their colleagues acting as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, did the military planning; e.g., what kind of forces and where they should be deployed; this was the province of the military. Secretary of Defense Gates was an exception; at least he jumped in and got the SIOP going, the integrated strategic operational plan. We had one strategic nuclear war to fight and one set of targets. To that extent it was a realization that there has to be a uniform, single integrated strategic operations plan. That much was understood. But the gap between planning and budgeting still remained, right into the Kennedy-Johnson administration. McNamara was sold early on that that gap ought to be filled, and correctly so. It was a shame to operate in such a haphazard way. In revising the last Eisenhower budget he was already thinking along that line. He wanted a quantitative analysis behind the decision as to what kind of forces, how fast, etc. Then

we got to those task forces, and they were put to work to come up with the changes. We broke out strategic forces, then general purpose forces, the R&D program, and then the fourth was added for the logistics program. So his mind was already working in this direction when along came the RAND people. He must have read some of their books. It was probably Hitch's book that called Hitch to McNamara's attention. He was credited with being the principal author, which I gather he wasn't. Here was a made to order thing in his book, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age.

When McNamara first came in, he read everything--the Hoover Commission reports, the General Accounting Office reports, Hitch's book--whatever someone called to his attention. So he already knew what the possibilities were. He ordered Hitch to get on with the job and set a completion date about one year earlier than Hitch proposed. Dozens of people were brought in from Rand. They broke out the major programs--strategic offensive, strategic defensive, airlift forces, tactical ground forces, air forces, naval forces, the RDT&E program, communications, intelligence, reserve forces, etc., all of which created a new bookkeeping problem: how do you mesh the major programs into the existing budget structure? It was proposed, I think by Novick, to eliminate the old budget structure--military personnel, O&M--and put in its place the new program structure, but that was totally unacceptable on the Hill. The committees on the Hill got used to the budget structure that McNeil created and that they gradually shaped over a period of years. That's the way they appropriated

funds, and that structure they could understand. The new program structure would take a long learning period before the committees could deal with it and appropriate funds in that format, if they could do it at all. It was decided early on to forget about that idea. I think I covered this matter in one of Hitch's first speeches, namely, that we were not going to eliminate the old budget structure. It was totally impractical to do so. Even the Treasury accounts were set up on the basis of the old appropriation structure. That's how the constitutional provision, that you can't draw money out of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated by the Congress, is controlled and enforced by the Treasury. So that was the first decision. It would have been cleaner if they could have eliminated the old budget structure and substituted the new program structure. To be able to reconcile the two, they developed a matrix where you could go from the programs across the top of the table to the budget categories along the left side of the table. It was like the transmission in a car. You broke out the programs, the strategic forces program into its budget category parts--military personnel, O&M, procurement, etc.--so that you could reconcile the two sets of accounts. We had an embarrassment there because of the "black program." This breakout gave a better idea to anybody on the outside, since it was unclassified, as to where that money was hidden. We had to discontinue that matrix. But at the beginning it served its purpose; it gave everybody a uniform understanding of how you moved from the dollar amounts and numbers in the programs--e.g. numbers of aircraft that you find in the program--the old budget categories and appropriation accounts. It was a tremendous effort and took an enormousnumber of manhours.

So they did bridge the gap by moving from the planning, in which the JCS took an active role, the force planning, to the programs to support those forces to the dollars (i.e., the costs) and the last step, translating all of this into the budget categories and appropriation accounts with which Congress was familiar and insisted on maintaining. There would have been chaos on the Hill if they didn't do that. So that's the way it was done and it worked.

McNamara established certain break points with regard to program changes. He said that any change in a major program of over, I think, $25 million had to get his personal approval; any change in a minor program of over about $1 or $2 million also had to get his approval. So he was in charge of approving the program in the first place, then controlling changes to it. That's all written out precisely in the descriptions of the system. The interesting thing was that no one thought it could be done. I myself asked him, "If the Air Force wants to take $5 million from the B-52 program where they have surplus funds and apply it to a fighter program where they are short, do you want them to come back for your specific approval in writing; i.e., a program change action?" He said, "That's precisely what I mean." I said, "This is unheard of. When I was at Wright Field, if the Air Force headquarters had done that we would have taken offense. We would have said, 'Tell us how many airplanes you want of each kind, when you want them, and how much money is available, and we'll take care of the small, fine-tuning adjustments among the programs. If we are over in one place and we need it in another

place, we'll move it at Wright Field in Dayton, Ohio. We don't need you to do it in the Pentagon.'" Here he was taking away decision-making authority not only from the Materiel Command, where they buy the airplanes, but from the Air Staff, the Department of the Air Force, bringing the decisions into his own personal office. This was a revolutionary change in the way we did business in the Defense Department.

Matloff: Where was this facet coming from? Was it from his experience in the business world?

Glass: The cut-off point was his decision. The concept was that he would maintain personal control. That's the way they did things at Ford, centralized control.

Goldberg: Did he personally review all of these, then?

Glass: At the beginning, yes. In time, when he had more confidence in the staff, it got to be pro forma with him. He knew a lot about it, so he was able very quickly to sign off on things. The services were made part of this process. When they initiated a program change, it was sent down to Enthoven's office, and after he reviewed it, he would either pass it on to Hitch or directly to McNamara. By the second year they had a pretty good feel for what he wanted. The system could be worked, but it was a deep intrusion into the work and responsibilities which had before been the Comptroller's and the services'.

Matloff: What role was left for the JCS in this process?

Glass: That was always a bone of contention. Enthoven's function brought him deeply into the military planning area. The Chairman's problem was

having something to say that wouldn't duplicate the Secretary's statement which went deeply into military planning. The Chiefs did get to feel like a fifth wheel, although they still maintained their differences with the Secretary.

Matloff: What from your perspective were the dominant influences in setting the Defense budget in the Kennedy administration?

Glass: This, again, was a little obscured. To an economist, the problem of cost versus benefits could be looked at two ways: to get the most defense for a given amount of money; or to get a given defense program for the least amount of money. Hitch had no problem with that; nor did I. Enthoven is an economist by training, too. But McNamara had a problem with it; he was an accountant, not an economist. He insisted on maintaining to the bitter end that this country can afford whatever defense program it needs. He had a whole litany to go with that, which you probably know by heart by now. He insisted that we start with the program, and whatever that program costs, that's what we ask for. But there is no question that he had to keep in mind the overall federal budget and fit the Defense program in to that. In his way of reviewing the program he could keep working it over until he got it within the necessary bounds. I feel that this is what he had in the back of his mind, even though he would not acknowledge it. I talked to Hitch many times about the difficulty of conveying to McNamara that there is nothing wrong with doing it either way. In the Eisenhower administration we started with a sum of money, which he would set one way or another in a Cabinet meeting some

time in May, preceding the budget year, and we would try to get the most defense out of the given sum of money. That was enough of a problem in trying to work the program down. It is unfortunate that Reagan hasn't been doing more of this. That's what is going to have to be done. McNamara would not acknowledge that he had to fit the Defense program into the total federal budget, so we had to keep that policy line going in everything having to do with him.

Matloff: Were there any changes in the Johnson administration in connection with the dominant influences over the Defense budget from what they had been under Kennedy?

Glass: No, the transition was very smooth. The big problem was on the non-Defense side, the social programs.

Matloff: How about the increasing involvement in the Vietnam War?

Glass: In my opinion, our increasing involvement in it started with Kennedy. If you look at the last figure in the Eisenhower administration of the number of U.S. military personnel in Indochina, it was less than 1,000. By the time Kennedy died, it was something like 20,000. It started with Rostow and Max Taylor going over there, and it just kept going up until we got in it with both feet. By that time, spring of 1965, it was either in or out. I thought it would be out, but we got in with both feet.

Matloff: Were McNamara and Hitch satisfied with Defense's share of the Federal budget?

Glass: They took the budget up within the first few years from about $40 billion to about $50 billion a year. That's a 25 percent increase in NOA

and actual expenditures. That was considered a hefty increase in peacetime. It was considered a complete response to Kennedy's campaign promises and his position that defense was inadequate. McNamara was always conscious of money; he was not one to throw it around. He intended to keep the cost of defense as low as possible. I am sure that he had in mind the total Federal budget and fiscal/budgetary policy, the broader aspects of the problem. He came from a business school, and, as I said, he was an accountant. He came from Ford, where the budget, spending, and costs were very important considerations. He was very familiar with Ford costs, even down to the cost of nuts and bolts.

Goldberg: He had been the comptroller.

Glass: He was involved in decisions of whether to make parts in house or buy them on the outside. Those decisions turned on costs.

Matloff: I was curious to know how much of the origins of this new approach to the budget was coming from the Rand studies and how much from his own experience in the business world.

Glass: I think the planning, programming, and budgeting concept came from Rand, but his management style, his great concern about costs, came from his experience at Ford. He told me once that to be a good executive you have to be willing to make decisions and be right more than 50 percent of the time. He was a believer in marching up to the decision and making it. Charlie Wilson tended to put off the decision and hope that the problem would disappear. McNamara would go out of his way to make a

decision. He would not postpone. The ABM, however, became a problem for him, because he didn't have his heart in it; i.e., the decision to go ahead with production and deployment of a light system.

McNamara was a good manager. In one year, maybe FY 1965, we underspent the budget estimate by $2 billion or $2 1/2 billion. This was outlays, expenditures. He wanted to know what happened, why we spent less than the budget estimate. Something didn't go according to plan, and he wanted to know what, in detail. He told Joe Hoover, the chief budget officer, to give him a complete analysis of the discrepancy. Hoover was fit to be tied because he thought McNamara should be happy we were under the budget. But McNamara wanted to know whether it was planning, something that should have been done that wasn't, whether the program didn't advance as it should have, or was it a saving. Hoover went to the services and came back with a detailed report. One of the reasons had to do with the Polaris program. The Navy would transfer money from the appropriation accounts to the Polaris management fund. At that point the funds would be intermixed and the appropriation account managers would lose track of those funds. Only Admiral Raborn and company, who ran the Polaris management fund, knew what was happening to that money--the flow of obligations and expenditures. The 41-boat Polaris program, missiles and all, was brought in below budget and on time. The Polaris management fund had accumulated surplus funds up to that point and decided to give them back to the appropriation accounts. When they gave that sum back, it showed up as a "negative" expenditure, at least $300 million on that item alone. There were many other items.

Goldberg: Do you know of any other weapon systems that did that well?

Glass: Not off hand. This program involved 41 boats, with 41X16 missiles, plus spare missiles, plus R&D, operating costs, the whole shebang. I know that McNeil was very pleased, because he was a great supporter of Raborn, and the setting up of that management fund system.

Goldberg: How did the services react to PPBS?

Glass: They resented it, of course. A lot of information about what was in the budget was exposed by shredding it out by program. It was also a big job for them; they had to come up with the initial figures. The Air Force, for example, had to define the B-52 program--what military personnel costs were involved; how much for O&M; how much for procurement of spare parts; any follow-on R&D, military construction, etc. In other words, they had to break out budget costs--military personnel, O&M, procurement, etc.--by program element--B-52, F-111, Titan II ICBMS, etc. This put an enormous burden on the services. They had to increase their staffs to handle it. We had a special group in the Comptroller's office in charge of programs for awhile. That was a separate operation, separate from Enthoven's business. There was a budget office, a program office, and a systems analysis office. Then they took systems analysis and programming and put them under a separate Assistant Secretary, Enthoven. That was how much McNamara was satisfied with the new system.

Matloff: To get back to the Posture Statements, how and when did they originate?

Glass: They originated with McNamara; between the two of us, I suppose. In the first year, 1961, we had three amendments to the Eisenhower budget.

We were involved in the first one very deeply: the first set of changes where the new policy directions were set. After the President's special defense message came McNamara's statement. Then came the second amendment, having to do with civil defense and the reserve forces. I didn't have much to do with the initial work; a lot of the initiatives came from the White House. I had to prepare McNamara's statement on what had already been decided in the second amendment. The third set was triggered by the Berlin crisis. The third was the most costly of the increases in the FY 61-62 budgets. Initially, we called up two National Guard divisions, to raise the total number to 16 on active duty. The decision to round out the three divisions used for training may have been made earlier. We had an increase in the Marine Corps, and other elements. It was a big add-on to the Eisenhower budget, bringing us closer to the $50 billion mark. That set of amendments was done in the Defense Department, because it dealt with "nuts and bolts," detailed force and program increases. We had to get into specifics, and the White House couldn't do that. There was no presidential Defense message for that, as far as I can remember. When it was ready, McNamara went over to the Hill and presented it to the committees. When that was behind us, we came to McNamara's first budget statement based on the Kennedy administration's own program and budget, not amendments to that of the old administration. I went in to talk to McNamara about the scope of the statement. First, the question of the character of the thing came up. He allowed that he wanted to discuss the programs in detail, the pros and cons. I told him that it would take

several hundred pages. He wanted it classified Secret, because he couldn't discuss these programs thoroughly on an unclassified basis. So it was agreed to write it as a Top Secret document and clean it out to get it down to Secret. The Joint Chiefs were not happy about the classification. McNamara then said that he wanted to discuss the organization of the statement in greater detail. I talked to him about the opening chapter and, as I indicated previously, he was very skeptical, but he said, "Let's see what you come up with." We decided we needed a chapter on organization and management, because of the Symington Committee, of which Gilpatric, who was then Deputy Secretary of Defense, had been a member. The Symington Committee Report called for a drastic reorganization, elimination of the military departments. This was a Kennedy-appointed committee. The question came up of what we should say about organization in view of that Report. I said that I hadn't as yet seen any movement along the lines of the Symington Committee report. Gilpatric was sitting there too. They didn't respond, so I asked them if they were going to adopt a pragmatic approach to the problem, namely, fixing what needs fixing and leaving the rest alone? That was the approach they both wanted to take. That told me to forget the Symington Committee report. The organization and management section would describe what measures had been taken or were planned. There were quite a few, but the Symington Committee recommendations were dropped.

Kaplan: Could the Symington report be considered a help to the McNamara plans in the sense that it was so radical that whatever changes were made after McNamara would look modest by comparison?

Glass: That could be, but once he had the planning, programming, and budgeting machinery in place and he had read the part of the 1949 amendment to the National Security Act, giving him certain powers in connection with Title IV, that was all the power he thought he needed. There isn't much that can be done without funds, and the Secretary's control over the flow of funds, that is, "rate of obligation" was the legal basis for his approval of the programs and his control over changes to the approved programs. In other words, he moved control of the service programs into his office without having to merge the services into OSD, as recommended by the Symington Committee.

Kaplan: Congressional opposition did surface from time to time. Could you say that he intended to use the law to make drastic changes without suffering disability?

Glass: The big fight would have been over eliminating the military departments.

Kaplan: The Defense Supply Agency seemed to be the occasion for . . .

Glass: I'll talk more about that later. The elimination of the military departments was a very big and controversial undertaking. It had been proposed many years before by the LaGuardia Committee--between World War I and World War II--and in other studies that concluded that we didn't need three military departments. The Symington Plan was to have an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Air Force, one for Army, and one for Navy, instead of the three separate military departments. This would have caused a tremendous battle on the Hill. The Appropriations Committees

had Air Force, Army, and Navy panels. They had reorganized themselves along service lines. It would have been a battle over a period of years. McNamara and Gilpatric saw no need to have that battle. He could do whatever he wanted to do within the existing law, and with the new procedural machinery he put in place. He could control their programs, from the planning stage on, so he didn't need to eliminate the military departments, although he felt no overwhelming need for them. Early on, he once asked me why the service secretaries and chiefs had to appear before the committees, that he could present the entire defense program all by himself. I agreed that he could, but pointed out that the members of congress always wanted to hear from the services as a check on the Secretary of Defense.

Kaplan: The charge of his wanting to unify the functions of the services under his control--is this a valid charge?

Glass: You mean of centralizing management? That was the accusation that was hurled at him constantly.

Kaplan: Is it a valid one?

Glass: There is no question about it. He centralized the management of the Defense Establishment.

Kaplan: The agency that has been identified as a quasi-secret one was the Partridge Commission. Were you involved in this in any way?

Glass: I remember it only vaguely.

Matloff: To go back to the Posture Statements--how much guidance did you get from McNamara, and later from his two successors, Clifford and Laird? Was this general or specific guidance?

Glass: I didn't need any specific guidance from McNamara, because much goes before the preparation of the statement. We had the program cycle in the spring and summer, the papers that Enthoven used to put out. The programs were reviewed in the summer, before the budget estimates were even prepared by the services. I was privy to all the discussions concerning the program approvals. The strategic forces program, for example, was formulated by Systems Analysis, circulated within OSD, the JCS, and the services for comment. It was a matter of just plugging in on the circuits. I sat in on the meetings where McNamara made his decisions on the programs proposed by Systems Analysis, and the arguments back and forth. I could sit in on any meeting and look at any document and talk to anyone I wanted to. The rest was up to me. He had other problems.

Matloff: You were almost a self-starter in this business. Did this change at all when Clifford and Laird came in?

Glass: In Clifford's time I really dealt with Nitze on the Posture Statement. Clifford presided; he did not manage the Defense Department. Nitze did what McNamara had been doing, reviewing the programs in detail. At one point Clifford told me, when I was complaining about his not understanding the budget terms, "Henry, do you see that incoming box? Every morning when I come in, it is higher. I can't do any more. I'm going to do just two things--NATO policy and Vietnam. The rest I'm leaving to Paul [Nitze]. So there's no point in my knowing the difference between an obligation and an expenditure, or one airplane from another." I had told him one morning, "You know, it doesn't look good, even for the staff,

your not knowing these things." He was already along in years. It took him three hours to review and memorize a 15-minute statement. He paid a lot of attention to how he would look when he went before a committee. He is a lawyer. He had to look good and he prepared himself thoroughly, but restricted himself to these two main topics.

Matloff: Did the character or emphasis in these posture statements change from Secretary to Secretary?

Glass: Not much with Clifford, who continued the Johnson policies, except at the end, with regard to the Vietnam War. It got so that Nitze and I felt so estranged from the direction in which the anti-Vietnam war policy was going, that we decided to leave that part of the Posture Statement to ISA. Warnke headed ISA at the time and he had people there who strongly opposed Johnson's Vietnam policy, including Morton Halperin. There was a lot of undercutting of Johnson's policy going on in the building towards the end of that administration. That was extremely distasteful to me, because I was accustomed to helping the administration express its views, whatever the policy was, like a lawyer--not to mix my own views with the client's views, the administration's views in this case. Nitze felt as I did. We reached the point where we said, "There is no point in my doing the first chapter. Let's give the whole thing to Warnke and company and let them write it." Clifford had made a complete turnaround after he made his trip out to the Pacific to try to drum up more support from our allies out there. He came back totally disillusioned. He said, "Those people out there don't want to do anything. Why should we have to do it?"

Matloff: Did ISA then write that part of the statement?

Glass: Yes. That year it was written by Warnke and company. It was the tone that Clifford wanted. The rest of it I did and it was reviewed by Nitze. That was at the end of the Johnson administration and Clifford was already tuned out.

Kaplan: Was the President involved? He must have been aware of the change in what was written earlier, and what Warnke was writing.

Glass: Johnson had decided he was not going to run again and was just interested in finishing his administration. In the last year of an administration things fall apart, anyhow. It did with Gates, too. At that time the bureaucracy keeps the ball rolling more than normally, which it can do as long as the policy course is unchanged. If we have to change the policy, the bureaucracy cannot do that very handily, because nobody has the authority to do that. I don't think Johnson particularly cared what Clifford's statement contained. Clifford was gone when it went up to the Hill. It was simply a matter of record. When the Laird team came in, they started revising the Johnson program.

Matloff: Was there any change in the character or emphasis of the statement under Laird?

Glass: The first year there were two or three amendments to the Johnson budget. So the first problem was to review that budget and decide what changes should be made. Because of Laird's connections on the Hill, he was able to postpone his appearance on the budget to a very late date. I wrote the statements for the changes and Baroody reviewed them, but I

believe Laird never read them before he got to the Hill. The first time around he called me into his office and asked why I included $24 1/2 million for Poseidon stellar inertial guidance. That proposal had been in and out of the Poseidon program several times. Sen. Brooks objected to it and Laird obviously didn't know what was in the amendment. He had delegated the review of the budget to Packard, and I sat through the review. I would jot down the decisions and the rationale as Packard made them. The Navy wanted this thing put back in, because it would make the Poseidon almost a counter-force weapon and put them in competition with the Air Force Minuteman III. Packard approved it and I explained in one paragraph that it was included to improve the accuracy of the Poseidon. So Brooks started off with the first-strike litany and Laird realized that it wouldn't gain him any brownie points with the committee. When he raised the question, I told him that Packard had made the decision, not I. It should have been clear to him that I didn't have the authority to make such decisions. He said, "That's like dropping a bomb in a pickle barrel. We ought to get rid of it." I forget what eventually happened. You will have to check to see if it got thrown out of the program.

Goldberg: Not until volume VII.

Glass: With regard to that same statement, Laird had talked to Abrams, then the commanding general in Vietnam, and had been told that the most important thing he needed was 1800 B-52 sorties a month. Laird told him that he would get it. The bombs involved in that number of sorties amounted to a lot of money. We got word from the White House that the

President had decided to cut total federal expenditures and the Defense cut was $500 million. We were already moving into the new fiscal year. and the scramble had begun on another set of changes. When the $500 million cut hit us, we began to look for fast spending money. If we could reduce the sorties, we could get a large part of the $500 million out of the savings on the bombs and the operating costs of the B-52s. Packard and company decided to cut the sorties back to 1200 a month from the 1800 included in the first set of amendments. That produced most of the 1/2 billion dollars, and a lot of other smaller changes were made. Laird went up to the Hill and presented the statement, came back to the Pentagon and asked me why I had cut the B-52 sorties. I knew what the problem was and didn't bother to point out that Packard made the decision, I simply told him the reason why it had to be made. To get the $500 mil savings out of weapon system procurement, we would have had to take out about 1 1/2 billion dollars of programs in the new fiscal year. He understood the mechanics of the thing. It was a great embarrassment when he went up to the Hill and he wasn't aware of the changes in the priorities. When we get to the posture statements you can see the changes in Laird's first one, over which Baroody had the most control. There were pictures and charts, things that McNamara didn't go in for. I retired from OSD by the end of the year and Baroody took over my job.

Goldberg: When did you come back?

Glass: It must have been right away, as a consultant, to help Baroody do his first posture statement.

Goldberg: So that was the 1970 posture statement.

Kaplan: When Kissinger presented that state of the world blockbuster, you were there. Was your statement influenced by the Kissinger statement?

Glass: I would say yes. I think that we incorporated the theme into the statement. I was very skeptical about the talk of the Nixon doctrine--strength, alliances, and negotiations--the three principles. I thought that it was the usual baloney that every new administration puts out. However, when you look back, they did what they said they were going to do. I think that Kissinger made a great contribution in clarifying the thinking and giving direction to the new Nixon policy.

Matloff: Of those that you worked on, which do you regard as the most important of the posture statements?

Glass: The posture statement was tailored to McNamara. It was part of his style of management.

Matloff: Are there any that were the most important in his era?

Glass: I suppose that his first one was the most important, because that unveiled so much on organization and management, procedures, and his approach to the whole Defense problem and policies. It gave us an opportunity to restate in a more orderly and organized manner what appeared in the Defense message and McNamara's statements on the first, second, and third sets of Kennedy amendments to the Eisenhower budget. He had to back around on some of these earlier decisions. The second set of amendments went astray with regard to having two Reserve component divisions getting ready for deployment in three weeks. We had to back off that in

a hurry, and also off the 40 M-Day NATO division plan and go back to the 30. The first posture statement for FY 1963 gave us an opportunity to straighten everything out, take a second look, and reconsider things. There was a lot of complaint about first-use of nuclear weapons, for example, and that policy was clarified. Symington attacked the administration because it was backing away from the first-use policy in Europe, which was part of the NATO defense strategy. I think we had to scramble around over what the President had said, and the Secretary of Defense and Gilpatric had said, to show that that wasn't so. This idea of no first-use came from Sorenson, a paragraph that he got in somewhere about not believing in first-use, and that triggered that whole controversy. Fortunately, we had enough other statements from the principal officials to show there was no change in that policy, that we did not preclude first-use of nuclear weapons in Europe.

Goldberg: Did McNamara believe in first use?

Glass: At that point, he did. That's another topic, the evolution of McNamara's thinking.

Matloff: What advice or cautions would you have for historians using these posture statements?

Glass: A general caution, that the historian should put himself in the time of the people he is writing about, to know what the Secretary of Defense and his colleagues knew at that time, in order properly to evaluate the things they did, instead of just looking back with the advantage of hindsight and criticizing. That distorts history. Nitze

agrees with this concept, as some of you know. The historian should be aware that the story changes from one year to another as conditions change. Very often the administration itself doesn't know the truth. The Cuban missile crisis is a case in point. At the very moment that Bill Bundy went before one of the committees to testify about the missiles in Cuba, assuring them these were defensive missiles, it was discovered that they were indeed offensive missiles. So you have to distinguish between deliberate misinformation being fed out for political reasons or to cover up mistakes and the fact that sometimes the administration itself simply didn't know all the facts. The reporters often feel that Defense people are lying. Take Fred Hoffman, who thinks McNamara is a liar. He keeps berating me about McNamara lying to them all during the Vietnam War. Also, the Secretary of Defense must follow the President's policy. He can't just sit here in the Pentagon and contradict what the President is doing. Toward the end McNamara began to change his attitude not only toward strategic matters, but also toward the Vietnam War. But he did not desert Johnson; he tried to be supportive of Johnson as long as he was here. When the Secretary of Defense acts, he might be acting against his own views. If it gets too much to swallow, he'll get out. I think Vance did just that.

Goldberg: As Secretary of State, he did it.

Glass: Yes. Up to that point, he owes loyalty to the President.

Matloff: Is there anything specific for historians to keep in mind with reference to these posture statements that you could mention?

Glass: It's hard to answer without reviewing the statements.

Kaplan: I have several specific questions, and one concerns civil defense. It seems to me that McNamara was saddled with the responsibility for civil defense without initially wanting it. Once he had it, he seemed to bring a good deal of enthusiasm to the program. He had a director under him. Is it fair to state that he lost interest in it or abandoned it as a major part of his concerns?

Glass: This is part of the evolution of his thinking on strategic warfare. The civil defense initiative came from the White House. That was in the second amendment, together with the readiness of the reserve force. McNamara was never too concerned about civil defense. Yarmolinsky got the first job. When it got to be too much for him to handle, he turned it over to Pittman. A new bureaucracy was set up, incidentally. Everybody was to build a civil defense shelter. Yarmolinsky actually built such a shelter at his home, independently, underground. We had been through this drill in the Eisenhower administration, I am talking about blast shelters against atomic bombs, not just protection against fall-out. The cost of that proposal was $25 billion, which horrified Eisenhower, and that was the end of that project. The Kennedy civil defense program was different. It was to defend against fallout, not detonations. As McNamara began to go to "assured destruction," the name of the game was deterrence, not defending against attack. The whole "damage limiting" program got less and less emphasis. This is interesting because there was a study on counterforce which I think Bill Kaufmann of RAND was promoting at the time.

McNamara was attracted to that at the beginning of his tenure, and part of his damage limiting program included counterforce, as well as defensive measures. That's why we moved away from the concept of strategic offense and strategic defense as two separate forces with two separate objectives. The distinction became "assured destruction" and "damage limiting." That was sensible, because part of damage limiting concept was defensive and part was offensive. The counterforce part was offensive. It was an interesting study. It looked very attractive and the central issue was: Can you get a weapon with sufficient accuracy to do the counterforce job against hard targets; e.g., ICBM in underground silos? I think that somebody was already talking about the Minuteman III, that within a certain number of years we would get something accurate enough to give us a counterforce missile. McNamara really knew very little about defense when he first came in. He had not kept up with defense issues. He had left the military problem at the end of World War II and had not revisited it, as far as I know, until he came back here. In his first year, he was open to a lot of different ideas, some of which panned out well, and some that didn't. Counterforce was one of them. It took him some years before he thought his way through to his final position. Civil defense was part of this defensive concept, defending against attack, and limiting damage as much as feasible. As he shifted away from damage limiting and put more emphasis on assured destruction, that is, from fighting a nuclear war to deterring such a war, civil defense just died out.

Kaplan: I can see that very clearly, except that assured destruction really came after he had abandoned civil defense.

Glass: Civil defense was part of the damage limiting effort. As he abandoned damage limiting, he abandoned civil defense as well. Then he relied on pure deterrence to prevent a strike in the first place--i.e., by threatening such massive retaliation that the other side would never dare strike at all.

Goldberg: He abandoned counterforce, too, then.

Glass: Yes. He became more and more leery and very sensitive to the words "first strike."

Goldberg: And also to the potential cost.

Glass: Yes, but we went ahead with the Minuteman III, anyway.

Goldberg: But not to the extent that the Air Force would have liked to. It was going to ride counterforce as far as it could.

OSD 3.3(b)(5)

Glass: That's right. That's why he threw out the stellar inertial guidance for Poseidon after putting it into the program earlier. As he got away from counterforce, which was part of damage limiting, a highly accurate Poseidon was not needed. [redacted] That changed the character of the whole program. He was working against the momentum of the course he had set early on. He had to shift his own course and pull everybody with him, because there were already great vested interests in the defensive programs, particularly the ABM system. He was right for the wrong reasons on the ABM. Towards the end of his time in the Pentagon, pressures began building up to start deploying the ABM. AT&T's Bell Labs was doing a lot of the work on ABM. He told me that the chairman of the board of AT&T told him, "If you are

not going to deploy the ABM, kill the program, because we are just reinventing the wheel over and over again. AT&T would like to get out of it, because we feel we're not really making any contribution and can use our resources better in our own business, the telephone." They didn't want to be involved in the production of the system in any event. McNamara had made up his mind that the ABM was self-defeating.

Kaplan: In that first year, could one say that the Berlin wall crisis, as it built up, was critical in postponing or distorting the early intentions of the McNamara Pentagon?

Glass: What guided McNamara the first year was what Kennedy said in his presidential campaign. There was a certain responsibility to make good on his campaign promises. A lot of them fell by the wayside, the B-70 being the most prominent. The Berlin crisis pushed McNamara to go beyond what he had in mind to start with, in the buildup, especially of the conventional, non-nuclear, general purpose forces. He did not want to increase the number of active army divisions to 16. He would have settled for 14, except that he wanted to make the three training divisions fully combat ready. This meant more resources, more people, more O&M costs, even more procurement, and putting the training back where it belonged, in the training command. But he did not have any plans to go beyond the 14. This crisis caused the calling up, as a safety measure, of two National Guard divisions, which became problems in themselves. They were far from combat ready. They didn't have all their equipment. Although there were shortages in equipment, they could have been committed to combat the way

they were equipped, but they weren't ready in terms of training. Those additions were supposed to be temporary. Max Taylor, who was in the White House at that time as military adviser to Kennedy, used that opportunity to increase the Army division force to 16. McNamara did not favor that. It was rammed down his throat, because Kennedy approved it in the White House at the urging of Taylor. That was why one of the high priority tasks McNamara had in mind was to get Taylor out of the White House and into the Pentagon. This is my judgment. Lemnitzer was Chairman of the JCS, and they couldn't bring Taylor in here without making him Chairman. They had to get Lemnitzer out in a dignified way, so they made him SACEUR. Once Taylor was here, McNamara didn't have that problem anymore. There shouldn't be two sets of military advisers, anyway; it's bad management. I don't know how Adm. Leahy functioned during WWII, he didn't seem to get in the way during the war. In peacetime, to have a man like Taylor in the White House, with a distinct Army point of view and a real axe to grind, didn't make sense. Lemnitzer didn't finish his term as Chairman. Norstad was SACEUR. Nobody replaced Taylor in the White House as the military advisor. This is my conjecture, because I know that McNamara objected to those two divisions since that raised the permanent force and we were stuck with it from then on. He tried very conscientiously to hold down to a practical minimum the additional funding that was required to make good on Kennedy's promises. Everything was carefully calculated with an eye to conserving money.

Kaplan: On the subject of Skybolt, how much involvement did you have with it? McNamara was criticized severely for embarrassing the British, creating a diplomatic incident.

Glass: He embarrassed Kennedy, too, with the missile gap. He called the shots as he saw them, especially at the beginning. Later he got to be more conscious of the political effects of what he was saying.

Kaplan: This is later, 1962.

Glass: It's not much later. I'm talking about the Vietnam War, when he had to be very careful about what he said. Skybolt was already in the system. The new administration added money to it. McNamara went out to California to the Douglas plant where it was being manufactured. He had a conference with the management, who were most cooperative. They made certain commitments about the delivery schedule and costs. Within a year, or less, they began to ask for more money and delays in the schedule. McNamara was incensed, having taken the trouble to visit the defense plant. He felt that they had deliberately misled him on the costs and delivery schedule. He took a look at Skybolt, decided it was not an essential element of the force, and threw out the whole program. He said, "That will teach the rest of them." He was one of the few Secretaries who attached great importance to costs. The political repercussions, with the British and Prime Minister Macmillan, were not in his province. He probably was not even aware of that part of it when he made the decision to terminate Skybolt. In my opinion he was perfectly justified, from a purely military point of view, to do what he did. It was a

good lesson to the whole defense industry--that he was not to be trifled with.

Kaplan: He was in correspondence throughout 1962 with Solly Zuckerman and Peter Thorneycroft, but I didn't catch anywhere a warning note about Skybolt.

Glass: He was looking at our own program, our own problems. I don't think that he thought the British would be losing much by kicking out the Skybolt, either. Did you talk to Enthoven about this?

Matloff: I think that we may have had some discussion about it.

Glass: The British problem was political. They didn't want to pay for a new system--they wanted to take the Vulcan bomber and extend its life by sticking the Skybolt in it and making it a "stand-off" bomber. It would provide the facade, excuse, and rationale, for not having to spend the money on a new strategic offensive system. McNamara, unintentionally, pulled the rug out and left them with the problem of finding some substitute.

Kaplan: Polaris missile was to be the substitute.

Glass: To buy the boats, plus the missiles, was a good move, but very costly for the British, considering their resources.